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THE THIRD WORLD: TOl4ARDS A DEFINITION 
WINS TON E I LANGLEY * 
INTRODUCTION 
The term "Third World," frequently used interchangeably 
with "developing areas," "the South," "less developed areas," 
"less developed countries," "underdeveloped states," "develop-
ing states", has come to be vaguely associated in the minds of 
people with many things. For some, it refers to certain 
nation-states which have come into existence as a result of 
the "anti-colonial revolutions" of the post-World War II era. 
But such a reference is inaccurate, since it does not include 
the states of Latin America, some of which fought their "anti-
colonial revolutions" over 150 years ago. For others, the 
term suggests a certain geographical identification - Asia 
(including the Pacific Islands), Africa, Latin America and the 
Caribbean. That geographical identification, however, while 
in general establishing the physical location of what are 
called Third World states, suffers from a weakness: states, 
~ Professor of International Relations, Boston State College. 
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like people, 1 may be in but not of the Third World. For 
example, Japan, Australia, New zealand. 2 The term also bears 
ideological as well as political associations. 
In the latter case, Third World is used to designate 
those states which, during the "cold War" years that followed 
World War I I, declined to become members of, or align them-
selves with either of the rival political blocs -- the Eastern 
bloc, led by the soviet union and the Western bloc, led by the 
Uni ted states. Since then the terms Third World and non-
aligned states have been used alternately. Again, however, 
there ~s an error. 3 Latin American states, by and large, have 
been aligned with the united states through the Rio Pact; and 
Cuba has been aligned with the Soviet union. And what of 
China? China was an ally of Moscow unt~l the problems between 
them during the late 60s and the 70s. 
As respects the ideological identification, the Third 
World is sometimes viewed negatively as states which are 
1. Further explanation is found in the discussion of the definition 
under the captions of "condition" and "attitude." 
2. .There are those who would suggest that South Africa is not of the 
Third World. 
3. When non-alignment is so viewed and defined, its essence is not 
captured. For further reading on non-alignment, some of it .confused, see 
Armstrong, Close View of the Nonaligned, N.Y. Times Magazine, Oct. " 
1961; Baboa & Crabb, Jr., Nonalignment as a Diplomatic and Idological 
Credo, 362 ANNALS 6 (1965); C.E. BLACK, NEUTRALIZATION AND WORLD POLITICS 
(1968); C.V. CRABB, JR., THE ELEPHANTS AND THE GRASS: A STUDY OF NON-
ALIGNMENT (1965); Chomeri, The Perce tual Base of Nonali n ment, 13 J. 
Conflict Resolution 57 (1969 ; Handlin, The Gullibility of Neutralists, 
ATLANTIC MONTHLY, March, 1963, at 41; G.H. JANSEN, AFRO-ASIA AND NONALIGN-
MENT (1966); Lyons, Neutrality, Neutralism, and Nonalignment, 3 INT'L REL. 
444 (1968); L. MATES, NONALIGNMENT: THEORY AND CURRENT POLICY (1972); 
Mazuri, The United Nations and Some African Political Attitudes, 18 INT'L 
ORGANIZATIONS 499 (1964); Nogas, The Neutralist World and Disarmament Nego-
tiations, 362 ANNALS 6 (1965); F.A. SAYEGH, THE DYNAMICS OF NEUTRALISM IN 
THE ARAB WORLD: A SYMPOSIM (1964); Thompson, Nonalignment in the Third 
World: The Record of Ghana, 11 ORBIS 1233 (1968); F.O. WILCOX, THE UNITED 
NATIONS AND THE NONALIGNED NATIONS (1962). Note that non-alignment does 
not mean uncommitted. See R.P. Peters, the Politics of Non-aligned States 
and the· Nuclear Text Ban Treaty (1973) (Unpublished doctoral dissertation, 
Boston University). 
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clothed in ideas of anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism; 
rather than positively as states having a systematic body of 
ideas about life and culture and promising alternatives to the 
socio-economic systems advanced by the eastern or western 
bloc. 4 
The thesis of this essay is that the Third World is a 
group of states which is defined by a condition and an atti-
tude. This essay will give a brief explanation of the 
condi tion and attitude and, from that explanation, propose a 
defini tion. In pursuance of the sought obj ecti ve, the work 
will be divided into two parts. Part I will focus on the 
condition, with initial emphasis on the socio-economic state 
of affairs which characterize the Third World. It will then 
proceed to consider structure as an element of condition. 
Part II will examine the attitude, beginning with its expres-
sion in the call, in 1974, for a New International Economic 
Order, and followed by two brief historical examples of its 
manifestation before the above date. The essay will then 
consider the ideological, political, political-economic, and 
legal thrust of the attitude, and end with a concluding comment 
which will include a brief definition. 
PART I: THE CONDITION 
The condition which is characteristic of the Third World 
can best be understood by presenting a brief profile of 
certain aspects of its socio-economic circumstance. And by 
way of sharpening the outlines of that circumstance, compari-
sons will be made, where possible, with non-Third World states. 
Condition Expressed In social and Economic Terms 
In a portrait of rich and poor nations for the year 1974 
(rich nations are those of Western and Eastern Europe, North 
4. P.E. SIGMUND, THE IDEOLOGIES OF DEVELOPING NATIONS (1967). 
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America, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan, and poor nations 
are those called the Third World, except that only Indonesia 
and Nigeria among OPEC members are included5 ) a recent World 
Bank study6 makes the following observations: the poor nations 
wi th a population of 2.8 billion (70 percent of total world 
population7 ), had a total G.N.P. of $632 billion (10.9 percent 
of the world G.N.P.), while the rich nations had a total 
G.N.P. of $4,991 billion; the average per capita income of the 
poor states was $226 while that of the rich was $4,537; infant 
mortality in the pQor states was 125 per thousand as compared 
with 25 for the rich; average literacy for the poor states was 
26.6 percent·, while that for the rich was 92 percent; malnu-
trition affected over 900 million persons (about 32.1 percent 
of the total population) among the poor while only 0.9 percent 
of the rich states' population was so affected. 8 
From the above statistics, one finds, among other things, 
economi~ poverty, serious limitations on one's chance to 
survi ve infancy, and, even for those who survi ve infancy, 
grave impairment to physical health awaits approximately one 
in every three. One does not find grounds for any reasonable 
exp~ctation of favorable change either, since available money 
5. For our discussion all members of OPEC are included in the Third 
World. 
6. WORLD BANK, PROSPECTS FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, 1976-1980 (1975). 
See also UNITED NATIONS, WORLD POPULATION PROSPECTS FOR 1970-2000 (1973). 
One may-wish to see certain estimates for 1990 in WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVE-
LOPMENT REPORT (1979). [hereinafter cited as WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT]. 
One will find some of the statistics difficult to calculate for the Third 
World in general. 
7. Total world population is now 4.2 billion of which poor nations have 
3 billion and the rich nations 1. 2 billion. Then rich nations had a 
population of 1.1 billion. 
8. The "Brandt Report" suggests that 40% of the Third World population 
are surviving but only surviving "in a kind of poverty we have been de-
scribing, with incomes judged insufficient to secure the basic necessities 
of life." W. BRANDT, NORTH-SOUTH: A PROGRAM FOR SURVIVAL 50 (1980). See 
also Address by Robert S. McNamara, University of Chicago, at 5 (May 22: 
1975). He also speaks of 40% poverty in the Third World. 
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capital for investment is limited, existing industrial power 
is very meager, and earnings from trade are staggeringly 
lean. continuing the portrait of 1974, the World Bank 
study indicates that total investment made by the poor states 
in their economies amounted to $114 billion -- a per capita 
figure of $40, while parallel figures for the rich were $1,098 
billion and $1,0009 ; and that while the poor states10 earned 
$134 billion in world exports (12.8 percent of total world 
export), the rich states earned $808 billion (77.5 percent of 
world exportll ). In 1975, 93 percent of world industrial 
power as measured by the volume of industrial production, was 
concentrated in the rich nations, with the Third World having 
12 but 7 percent. 
In the above trade and investment figures, one finds that 
the socio-economic circumstance of the Third World is dire. 
But it is becoming worse. According to Jonathan Power of the 
International Herald Tribune, the International Monetary Fund 
has estimated that the 1980 balance-of-payments deficits of 
developing states could be as high as $65 billion and could 
rise to nearly $90 billion by 1985. That projection compares 
unfavorably with a 1972 deficit which was but $5 billion. 13 
wi th growing debt burden, limited income, and scanty 
capital for investment, there is little or no opportunity for 
Third World states to expand industrial growth to parallel the 
9. It may be observed that members of OPEC invested about $31 billion -
a per capita figure of $310. 
10. Third World's share of world trade fell by about a third from 1950 to 
1970. Correspondingly, their debt grew. 
11. OPEC states earned about $101 billion (9.7 percent of world export). 
12. At the Second General Conference of the United Nations Industrial 
Organization (UNIDO) held in Lima, Peru in 1975, there was a proposal to 
effect a change from the 93:7 to a 75:25 distribution by the year 2000. 
H.W. SINGER, INDUSTRY AND DEVELOPMENT 1 (1979). 
13. Power, On Reforming the IMF, International Herald Tribute, Jan. 24, 
! 1980. 
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"explosive" rates of population growth 1n urban areas. 
Neither can they effect the development of the necessary 
infrastructure -- schools, housing, sewage, hospitals, roads --
to accommodate the urban population. 14 
The preceding profile of certain socio-economic factors 
which partially depicts the condition of what is called Third 
World is frequently translated into words such as poverty and 
underdevelopment. Julius Nyerere, President of Tanzania, 1n 
describing the Third World said: [it] "is not only that we are 
poor, both in absolute terms and in comparison wi th the rich 
nations, it is that within the existing structure of econom1C 
interaction we must remain poor and get poorer."l5 
Condition Expressed As structure 
The last portion of the preceding statement is particu-
larly significant. It suggests that structure is part of the 
condition that is being presented as characteristic of the 
Third World. In fact, according to Nyerere -- and some of the 
statistics presented above support him -- the structure makes 
it inevitable that the general condition will get worse. What 
is· this structure? It is the international economic frame-
work, and it operates in an unequal manner. By unequal opera-
tion is meant that, in the interaction or exchange which it 
provides, differential allocation or asymmetrical distribution 
of power resources among its members results. Thus, as a 
consequence, a social pattern is maintained and reproduced 
with members gaining unequal control over the power resources 
and enj oying di fferential positions. In turn, the unequal 
14. From Jakarta, Bombay and Lagos to San Paulo and ~lexico City, one 
finds the same problem: explosive rates of growth in urban population. It 
has been estimated that from 1950 to 1975 urban centers in developing 
states had to absorb about 400 million additional people, and that between 
1975 and the year 2000 they will have to absorb approximately another 
billion inhabitants. WORLD DEVELOP~IENT REPORT, ~upra note 6, at 112. 
15. Nyerere, The Pleas of the Poor: New Economic Order Needed for the 
World Community, NEW DIRECTIONS, Oct., 1977, at 16. 
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control and differential positions provide the conditions 
necessary for continued future asymmetrical exchange and 
unequal socia-economic relationships. 
When such an inequality in the social structure exists, 
the members (states in this case) are differentially affected 
I by what happens within the system, because they have different 
controls, occupy different positions, and 
capabilities to deal with it. 
In the present intelnational economic 
enjoy differing 
, interaction between the industrialized states 
system, 16 the 
(those cited 
above as rich f1i1tioIlS) and the Third World states is one which 
is defined by unequal exchange in favor of the former, because, 
to be specific, the cost and benefits of production, trade, 
finance, and other interchange between them are unevenly 
allocated to and accumulated by each group. Further, the 
industrialized group, by virtue of its position in the system, 
can modify or change the latter in such a way as to augment 
accumulation in its favor and to the disadvantage of the Third 
World. The latter group, on the other hand, must not only 
tolerate the unfavorable results of unequal allocation and 
accumulation, but must live with the fact that it is rela-
tively powerless to change its circumstances within the 
existing structure. 
To make the operation of the structure more concrete, it 
, , , , d k 17 
may be WIse to make a ThIrd World pOll tlca 1 lea er spea : 
[AJ re-examination by the new states of economic 
relationships which grew during the colonial period 
lS inevitable. Experience, combined wit.h analysis, 
quickly teaches the young and poor nations that the 
present international economic system works automa-
ticall¥ and inevitably to their disadvantage. 
There IS an automatic transfer of wealth from poor 
16. SeEO A. EMMANUEL, UNEQUAL EXCHANGE (1972); G. FRANK, CAPITALISM AND 
UNDERDEVELOP~1ENT IN LATIN AMERICA (1969); Galtung, A Structural Theory 
of Imperialism, J. PEACE RESEARCH 81 (1971); R.N. GARDNER, STERLING-DOLLAR 
i:iI PLOl1ACY Ti969 ); S. SIDERI, TRADE AND POWER (1970). 
17. Nyerere, supra [\ote 1.'>, at 16. 
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countries -- where it is needed to provide the basic 
necessities of life -- to rich countries, where it 
is spent creating and meeting new wants. 
I f there is an automatic transfer of wealth from poor to rich 
states, then there must be some reason for such a phenomenon. 
Nyerere cites a historical factor as one: "The present inter-
national economic and legal structure has developed gradually 
out of the interaction between the different nations of Europe. 
In the process, the countries which are now known as the Third 
World were not involved. They were either colonies of one of 
the major powers, or were so weak or so far away from the 
mainstream of economic intercourse that they were ignored. ,,18 
Not h~ving been parties to the current economic order, 
Third World states, understandably though not justifiably, 
have found themselves at a socio-economic disadvantage. But 
this historical fact hardly explains the continuation and 
aggravation of those disadvantages .• Nyerere posits some 
explanation: 
It is not true that prices are determined by 
the operation of a free market -- that is, by dis-
cussion and compromise between sellers and buyers. 
The price of manufactured goods is fixed by the 
producers and if any competition enters into the 
situation at all, it is between giant firms like 
Ford, General Motors and Volkswagen. It is cer-
tainly no use for the Tanzanian Motor Corporation to 
try and argue with any of these firms about their 
prices. If it is not willing to pay what is asked, 
the vehicles will wait in stock and Tanzania will 
continue without transport. 
Conversely, the price of primary products is 
fixed by the purchasers. The producers put on the 
market whatever they have managed to grow or mine, 
the goods are often perishable and in any case the 
18. rd.; see also Barraclough, The Struggle for the Third World, N.Y. 
RevieW-of Books, Nov. 9, 1978, at 47. The author notes, for example, that 
at Bretton Woods the needs and interests of the Third World were ignored. 
One should also note that Nyerere is not making any distinctions when he 
uses economi~ and legal structures. He is really suggesting that they are 
tied together. 
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poor nations are desperate for foreign exchange and 
have no facilities for storage ... 
The primary producing countries which need to 
import manufactured goods are thus price-takers 
not price-makers, both as sellers and buyers. We 
sell cheap and buy dear, whether we like it or not. 
This is the position of most Third World countries --
wi th the recent exception of the oi~ gProducers who 
now fix prices for the oil they sell. 
I f the statement above quoted accurately describes the 
actual condition it purports to, and in this writer's view it 
!does, then one may reasonably conclude that the exchange 
relationship between the industrial and Third World states is 
,asymmetrical. The former group sets the prices for the commo-
dities it produces and which Third World states must purchase 
,if they are to industrialize. That group also sets the prices 
for goods produced and sold by the nations of the Third world,20 
making the latter "price-takers" both as to that which they 
buy and that which they sell. Further, the asymmetry mani-
fests itself in the inequality of resource accumulation: 
because the prices at which Third World states must purchase 
are higher than those at which they can sell -- in Nyerere's 
words, they must "buy dear" and "sell cheap" -- the accumu-
lation of wealth flows in the direction of the nations from 
which Third World states must purchase. That is a major cause 
of the "automatic transfer of wealth from the poor countries ... 
. h .,21 to the rlC countrles. I 
19. Nyerere, supra note 15, at 17. The "exceptions" such as Korea and 
Taiwan, which have developed certain light industries, have been able to 
C do so because of special political circumstances. The structural asym-
metry is therefore not disproved . 
. 20. Oil represents an exception here. So oil exporting states are able 
to set the price of that commodity. 
,21. John Kenneth Galbraith, in observing the exercise of power usually 
flows down from the powerful to the weak while income flows up from the 
weak to the powerful, as serts : "I t is a rule worth having in mind. 
Income almost always flows along the same axis as power but in the oppo-
site direction." J .K. GALBRAITH, I THE AGE OF UNCERTAINTY 14-15 (1977). 
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I f the state of affairs described above is accurately 
presented, one may ask, why should not Third World nations 
seek to produce some of the goods which industrial states sell 
and thus benefit from the price structure which favors the 
latter states' products? Tradi tional economic and moderni-
zation theories urge the same course of action the question 
implies. They urge Third World states to develop and export 
their primary commodities in order to finance their import of 
investment and consumer goods and services required for their 
gradual industrialization. With the advent of industrializa-
tion, the reasoning goes, Third World states will be able to 
make and sell the very manufactured goods which command such 
high prices as compared with the low prices they had received 
for the primary commodities which their less-developed condi-
tion had compelled them to produce. 
worked. Why? 
The theories have not 
First, because it means that less-developed nations must 
put themselves in debt (if they must "sell cheap" and "buy 
dear", then they can only purchase what they need by borrowing 
in order to make up the difference between what they earn from 
"selling cheap" and what they spend from "buying dear"). 
Having to put themseleves in debt is partly why Third World 
states' balance of payments deficits are estimated to have' 
grown from $5 billion in 1972 to $65 billion in 1980. 22 
It may be argued that once less-developed states begin to 
industrialize they will be able to payoff the debts, using, 
the increased wealth they will have begun to enjoy from the 
sale 'of manufactured goods. The conclusion contained in the 
preceding statement presupposes, however, a market for these 
manufactured goods; otherwise what has been called a "trap" 
develops. Once again one may turn to Nyerere to obtain con-
crete examples of the problem: 
To break out of this foreign exchange trap [always 
spending more than what is being earned), and at the 
22. Power, supra note 13. 
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same time benefit from the multiplier effect of 
expanded economic activity, the poor countries 
endeavor to build up their industrial sector, to 
become price-makers, even in a small way. Natur-
ally, we start with the processing of our own 
primary products. It seems logical to export cloth 
rather than cotton lint, and twine or rope rather 
than sisal. Such simple manufacturing processes can 
provide a little platform for further industriali-
zation. But having established these factories at 
enormous expense, we discover that processed com-
modities and manufactured goods are not so easy to 
export as raw products. They meet tariff barriers, 
quota regulations, or other devices ~~tended to keep 
them out of the markets of the rich. 
It is not to be supposed that, if there were not the 
above-mentioned barriers to trade between Third World and 
industrial states, the former would be able to correct its low 
purchasing power and take the necessary steps toward indus-
trialization. The international credit which Third World 
states have been able to obtain has usually been limited in 
quanti ty as well as the use to which it may be put --- very 
often circumscribing rather than facilitating certain areas of 
trade between less-developed and industrialized states, some-
times failing to support the acquisition of the very goods 
which are necessary to effect the type and extent of indus-
trialization sought. Nyerere understood this when he said: 
The low international purchasing power of poor 
nations is a factor in keeping them locked in their 
poverty. To expand output, we need plants, equip-
ment and machines, as well as technology and know-
how embodied in the production and use of such 
goods. The developed countries have these goods and 
services to sell, but we cannot buy them because we 
are not entitled to more than. our poverty-based 
"quota." Instead of facilitating growth in the 
world by enabling the poor to buy more -- mostly 
capital goods from the rich -- international credit 
has b~en fled to promote trade between the rich 
countr~es. 
23. Nyerere, supra note 15, at 18 . 
. 24. rd. Only some forms of trade are not facilitated between industrial-
ized and Third World states. Regardless of Nyerere' s claim, is there any 
reason why China with over 20% of the world's population and India with 
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The use of credit to promote international trade of a 
certain emphasis and/or in a certain direction25 is consistent 
with the entire structure of the international economic system., 
This system's financial component is regulated by the Inter-
national Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank (the International 
Bank for Reconst~uction and Development - IBRD) as well as the 
dominant banking institutions of the US, Japan, and Western 
Europe. The latter states, by virtue of their voting power on 
the governing bodies of the IMF and the IBRD, determine the 
amount of capital which goes to other nation-states, the 
purposes for, and the conditions under which, said capital is 
given and used. 26 In short, within the economic system of 
unequal allocation of power resources, in which wealth auto-
matically moves in favor of one group of states and to the 
27 disadvantage of others, the very states which benefit from 
the uneven operation of the system, by virtue of their 
ppsi tion and power wi thin the system, make the rules and; 
determine the conditions under which the system operates. 
If one had to define the Third World, therefore, one 
would begin by noting that it is a group of states which has 
remained poor and is becoming relatively poorer because it is 
over 15% should have only 4% and 2% respectively, of world income/ 
production? D.M. SMITH, WHERE THE GRASS IS GREENER: LIVING IN AN UNEQUAL 
WORLD 54-55 (1979). 
25. Because the IMF and the IBRD decide what projects they will support 
and/or the conditions under which a loan will be given, a certain emphasis 
or direction in trade can be assured. For example, a loan may be given 
for the production of a given commodity, but the latter is part of trade 
relations between only certain states. 
26. See R.ALBIER, THE INTERNATIONAL MONEY GAME (1973); R. CARBOUGH & L. 
FAN, THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM - HISTORY, INSTITUTIONS, ANALYSES 
(1976); L. CHANDLER, THE MONETARY-FINANCIAL SYSTEM (1979); C. PRAGER, THE 
DEBT TRAP: THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND AND THE THIRD WORLD (1974). 
27. The Soviet Union and the East European states play no significant 
role in the IMF or the World Bank. In fact, with the exception of Rumania, 
Poland and Yugoslavia, no state among that socialist group is a member of 
these institutions. 
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obliged to "sell cheap" and "buy dear". It must also borrow 
from those from whom it "buys dear" in order to cover its 
i deficits and, therefore, must put itself in debt. But it 
cannot pay for the debts because it continues to "sell cheap" 
and "buy dear" and must borrow to pay for previous debt, and 
must go to the very parties to whom the debts are owed to 
. contract more debts under rules and regulations made by the 
i credi tors -- rules which continue to promote a structure of 
unequal exhange. 28 
PART II: THE ATTITUDE 
The nations referred to as the Third World may also be 
I defined by a certain attitude one which manifests itself in 
a posture which holds that their condition is substantially 
the result of existing world socio-economic structures; and 
'that a change in the latter is a prerequisite for any change 
in their condition. The new order which would follow the 
sought change is not one which would reproduce the socio-
economic system of either the First World (North America, 
., 
Japan, Western Europe, Australia and New Zealand) or the 
Second World (the Soviet union and the Socialist states of 
Eastern Europe); it would represent a "third way" in the 
approach of human beings to international problems. 
In more specific terms, finding that the existing world 
socio-economic structure, in the words of former Secretary of 
State Henry Kissinger, "is loaded against [their] interests,,,29 
:28. See Albier, supra note 26; Beim, Rescuing the LDC, 55 FOREIGN AFF. 
1,717 (1977); G. RANIS, THE GAP BETWEEN RICH AND POOR NATIONS (1972); B . 
• WARD , THE WIDENING GAP (1971) W.A. WILLIAMS, THE TRAGEDY OF AMERICAN 
lDIPLOMACY (1959); see also the attitude of Third World states toward 
"discussions of their external debts in U.N. Doc. A/31/pv.108, at 8-10 
(1977). 
'29. Address by Henry Kissinger, Kansas City, Missouri (May 13, 1975), 
:reprinted in DEP'T ST. NEWSLETTER 7 (June, 1975); see also: Kissinger's 
1view that Third World states no longer wanted to be on the periphery of 
'world order in, Corea, UNCTAD and the New International Economic Order, 
53 INT'L AFF. 179 (1977). 
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that succeeding years of development aid had failed,30 and 
31 that their future prospects were no better, Third World 
states, in 1974, demdnded a change in t.ne exist.ing world 
socio-economic stxiictu.i:."e and called for the establl.slunent of a 




however, as the fi rs t attempt at a collective ex-
of Third World stales' unwillingness to accept 
socio-political and socio-economic world order. 
There are, among others, two previous occasions of which one 
should take note: the Bandung Conference of 1955 and the 
creation, in 1964, of the "Group of 77." 
Historical overview 
The former event was a meeting of Afro-Asian states held 
in Bandung, Indonesia, 





meeting which is 
the non··aligned 
. 32 
movement. This movement came into being as a response to 
bi-polar political structure of the post-world War 
a structure in which there were two principal 





30. The Development Decades of the UN failed to achieve the goal of 
having industrial states contribute a modest portion of their GNP (the 
Second Development Decade sought 0.7% of each state's GNP) to Third World 
economic development. 
31. It should be noted that the results of studies have confirmed this 
view. A U.N. study of the futQre of World economy established that even 
if Third World states were to realize their growth targets (not entirely 
likely) the 12 to 1 gap in per capita gross product which existed between 
them and the industrialized states in 1970 would continue to the year 
2000. W. LEONTIEF, THE FUTURE OF WORLD ECONOMY: A UNITED NATIONS STUDY 3 
(1977); see also S. AMIN, I ACCUMULATION ON A WORLD SCALE: A CRITIQUE OF 
THE. THEO~OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT (1975). 
32. For literature on non-alignment, see note 3 supra. One lIlay a Iso 
observe that China found the structure of the Eastern bloc prejudicial to 
its interest. E. CRANKSHAW, THE NEW COLD WAR: MOSCOW V. PEKING (1963). 
33. Not unlike Sparta and Athens, Carthage and Rome, England and Spain in 
the 17th century. 
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i gro:lped most of the ot.hcr states which had gained their poli-
1 . ., . 
,tICdl J.ndepentience lle L .. ,'(" 1.;1'1:', The states which gatli,,~red at 
, d' . . t' I' t' t d \ d t\. E~ti·',r,':J \.",;'1'" )' .... ". nt:cn:ral tlmpar Ia In d.tl u t, t:owar ·.JJe 
j 
issLle.~ ()f tl~'· :. "y, Jill t Li1ey knew they could not influence tl'!t: 
ope:cation ·f U1t;; l'J."~'dldr system by becoming a members cf 
ei the'l bloc 0.1: pole. 'l'hey also felt t,hat the manner: j n which 
• the S}'st-=lH operated ill-accorded wit.h their interest.s. In 
I orl'1~r to pi,"y <:t role in the vital issues affect.ing them and 
the "'f,rId at large, they f('r:med the non-aligned movement. 
4Tr~is movell,ent sought to hcive its members act collec':lvely to 
aid each aU:,;:!:' and T.O confroI!t the two bloc~). 
'1'118 "Group of 7'7".34 was formed in 1 g64 at the First 
: United Nations Conference OIl Trade and Development [UNCTA[J J by 
some Third WOl.ld stat.es, in order to negotiate iii:; a b.lOC wItn 
the developed, industrialized states of the No:cth. 
in the case of the foundIng of the non-aligned movt:illent,:.ii.i::. 
atti tude of Third World states was that the exist.ir,.g st.I:ucture 
(in t.his ins tance the socio-economic st,ructure) prevented 
I change from within; t.hat in order to influtilce its oper:ation, 
I they would have to act from wi thouti dad Uldt action from 
! without could be S;!cCE3sful only if uJl1ec·tivi;; effort.s were 
pursued. The NIEO exhibits this very att.i tuds. Its fiatm.:e 
and implications, hO'."ever, suggest much more l.han ex~rcssed 
35 
v lews seem t.o convey. 
The proposal for the establishment of a He.,' International 
Economic Order, contained in the Declaration on the Establish 
34. The group now number more than 120 sLates, some of h'hi,:h are not of 
the Third World. 
35. Alliin, Se If -Re Ii ance and the New Internati0u-'l1 Order, MONTHLY REV. i 
Aug. , 1977 ,--·-at-----l;--ReiT~--~(!l~.IUtur:.~_ World=Q~=~·r:~~~_=_:D~~_}nternati()n31 
Context of Crisis, f()]{ElGN P(lI.'Y, Summer, 1977, at 109; Bergstrom, The 
T_~.r:~~~~1.£9.!!1 ___ ~he-l!!,~r~\~~!_~~, FOREIGN POL'Y, Winter, I'l73, at 102; CO(!t-'ER; 
A New International Economic Order for Mutual Gain, Spring, 1977, at 65; 
I A:J:-DCirMAN & -J.V:-ETTINGE-~ PARTNERS IN TOMORROW: STRATEGIES FOR A 1'EW 
INTEltNATINAL ECONOMIC ORDER (1978); E. LASZLO, THE OBST-\CI.ES TO THE NEw 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER (1980); J. SINGH, A NEW INTVRNATIONAL ECONOMIC 
ORDER: TOWARD A FAIR REDISTRIBUTION OF WORLD'S RESOURCES (1977). 
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ment of the New International Economic Order, the Programme of 
Action, and the Charter on the Economic Rights and Duties of 
States, 36 far from being exaggerated in its political impli-' 
cations, 37 is nothing less than a general plan for future 
world order. And it involves structural changes in the eco-
nomic, political, and legal order. One may here cite a few of 
its specific demands: 
(1.' Improved terms of trade for developing states, as 
expressed in the principle of "indexation" -- the linking 
of prices of exports from Third World states to the' 
prices of their imports from industrialized nations, so 
that when prices of the latter's goods increase the 
former's will also; (2.) the establishment of a "Common 
Fund, II under international management to finance buffer 
stocks of certain raw materials and primary commodities 
produced by Third World states to assure stabilization of 
prices and earnings; (3.) removal of trade barriers --
tariffs and quotas -- by industrialized states to facili- '-
tate access to their markets for processed and manu-
factured materials of developing states; (4.) assured 
sharing of decision-making powers in the international 
financial institutions such as the IMF and the IBRD. 38 
36. See, United Nations Declaration on the Establishment of a New Interna-
tionalEconomic Order, 13 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 715 (1974); Progranune of 
Action on the Establishment of a New International Order, 13 INT'L LEGAL 
MATERIALS 720 (1974); Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, 14 
INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 251 (1975). One may also find the materials in, 
United Nations General Assembly Resolutions 3201 (S-VI) and 3202 (S-VI). 
37. Greene, Toward A Definition of the Term Third World, 1 THIRD WORLD 
1.J. 19 (1980). 
38. Others are: Increase in, and automaticity of transfer of financial, 
development resources from the rich to the poor states: guaranteed access 
to and an international code for the transfer of technology to developing 
states; an international code for the conduct of multinational corporations 
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Ideological Thrust 
On its face, given the above-cited specific demands, one 
is apt to regard the proposal -- as has been the case -- as an 
economic one. Further analysis shows that conclusion to be 
wrong. First, there is an underlying ideology which pervades 
the plan. It expresses, as does all ideologies, a certain 
vision, in this case, one encompassing the socio-economic 
world. It is that the existing political, social, and econo-
mic order is capable of being transformed, so that the oppor-
tuni ties it offers can be redistributed to the advantage of 
all. This vision runs counter to the position of orthodox 
Marxists who insist that nothing short of a revolution which 
topples the capitalist system can correct the inequities of 
the world. 39 And it is in conflict with the view of the 
capitalists, who see a transformation of the kind being sought 
by the Third World as prejudicial even to the redistribution 
40 
values which are being sought. 
Another ideological premise of the plan is that there is 
a collective moral responsibility to correct the morally 
indefensible extremes of socio-economic inequalities which 
exist on the globe, and that the First and Second World --
especially the former -- should share a major part of the 
b d t t h ' l't' 41 , 11 th 'd 1 ur en 0 correc t ese ~nequa ~ ~es. F~na y, e ~ eo ogy 
39. Magdoff, The Limits of International Reform, MONTHLY REV., May, 1978, 
at 11. 
40. See, ~, RAND CORPORATION, MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF A POSSIBLE 
WORLD ORDER CRISIS IN THE 1980'S (1977); D, GOULET, WORLD INTERDEPENDENCE: 
VERBAL SMOKESCREEN OR NEW ETHIC? (1976). By redistribution values is 
meant those principles and rules of international conduct which will 
! assure a change from the current inequitable allocation of resources to a 
more balanced and equitable apportionment among all states. 
41, There has been somewhat of a disappointment that the states of social-
ist Europe -- USSR and Eastern Europe, with the exception of Rumania and 
Yugoslavia -- have been concentrating more in East-West issues than on 
North-South ones. As will be seen in the latter part of this paper, the 
NIEO is seen as an order which will also benefit First and Second World 
states. 
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espouses cultural and political independence for nation-states 
as well as the need to assure an international cultural alter-
native to the socio-economic systems represented by the First 
and Second World. 
Poli tical Thrust 
If the principle of cultural and political independence 
is grasped, then one should understand how coherently it fits 
into the Third World IS rej ection of the general political 
objectives of "interdependence" as supported by industrial 
states. As espoused by the latter, interdependence contem-
plates transactions based on trans-national linkages which, 
when reproduced over time, will assure a form of relatively 
homogeneous world system, one based primarily on western 
values. 42 Since it envisions inter-actions within the exist-
ing asymmetrical world socio-economic structure, Third World 
states see interdependence as used above as fostering 
integrated dependency for them, not a system of "real inter-
dependence" in which there are symmetrically reciprocal gains 
and losses, benefits and burdens, rights and responsibilities, 
power and vulnerability. 
The pla.n also expresses the view that the struggle for a 
more equitable world order is a movement which is global in 
scope, with large masses of people demanding rights of socio-
poli tical and economic equality, and before which the hier-
archies which support discrimination based on language, nation-
ality, civil community, race, class, caste, sex and age are 
found wanting in legitimacy and are actually crumbling. Given 
the perception that the old and existing structures are the 
very ones which have given birth to the globe-endangering 
phenomena of pollution, the arms race, chemical and biological 
warfare, nuclear weapons proliferation, disappearing species, 
42. For some examples of the tension between dependence and ~nterdepen­
dence see Caporasa, Dependence, Dependency and Power in the Global System 
A Structural and Behavioral Analysis, 32 INT'L ORGANIZATIONS 13 (1978). 
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and dangerous dwindling of natural resources, Third World 
states feel that it would be irresponsible for them to lend 
support to the "interdependence" sought by the industrialized 
states. That interdependence, they feel, projects the false 
image that a modest managerial re-arrangement within the 
existing international structure can correct the global pro-
blems. They also feel that such a support would result in 
their bypassing a chance to gain a wider popular acceptance of 
their call for a new international order as well as an oppor-
tuni ty to form new coal i tions with First and Second World 
groups that have been disadvantaged by socio-economic malfor-
mations in those states. 43 
Perhaps the most weighty political reality underlying the 
proposal for a new international economic order is the fact 
that the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries [OPEC], 
in 1973-74, by its decision to effect a steep increase in the 
price of oil, had a fundamental socio-economic impact on the 
world at large. 44 There are at least two important political 
meanings which should be drawn from that course of conduct: 
first, although the specific action was taken by OPEC, it has 
been regarded as a collective victory for Third World states, 
since they feel that the action represents the first time that 
a matter of fundamental importance to the entire world was 
decided by any but non-Third World states. (AI though many 
Third World states have had to bear severe burdens as a result 
of the price increasE', mnny feel that OPEC's action was neces-
sitated by the existing socia-economic structure). Secondly, 
the action not only demonstrated that the world's economic and 
43. United Nations, Genera 1 Assembly Doc. AI 341 46 7 (Sept. 1979). Socie-
ties which are characterized by malformation are those which, although 
materially rich and industrially developed, have unjust and unbalanced 
patterns of social distribution. 
44. The world financial structure as created at Bretton Woods in 1944 has 
not been the same since. 
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financial structure is vulnerable to certain types of collec-
tive action,45 but also confirmed one of the less laudable 
lessons of history - that change in any political order is not 
the offspring of rational discourse but the product of the 
dialectics and/or balance of power. with the growing aware-
ness that the existing international structures are ill-
designed to cope with world socio-economic problems, and that 
there is a need to replace them, Third World states have 
concluded that they must strengthen themselves individually 
and collectively so that their interests can be adequately 
represented in any new order. They would prefer global nego-
tiations as a means to achieve that and, since action such as 
that engaged in by OPEC creates undesirable consequences. 
If the above-described attitude of Third World states is 
understood, then the NIEO will be seen as both a political 
process and a goal. It is a goal in so far as it seeks 
greater equity in the distribution of resources and control 
over what may be called "techno-economic relations". 46 It is 
a process in that it represents a plan for interaction with 
industrial states pursuant to the creation of a framework for 
a new international order. 
The Thrust of Political Economy 
One cannot, although one may wish to, separate the 
45. A.E. ECKES, JR., THE UNITED STATES AND THE GLOBAL STRUGGLE FOR 
MINERALS (1979); R. W. MARSDEN, POLITI CS , MINERALS, AND SURVIVAL (1975). 
46. The expression "techno-economic relations" is sometimes used inter-
changeably with "socio-economic relations." It is felt that technology 
conditions and/or controls social and economic relations; and, that in the 
case of industrial and Third World states, their asymmetrical interactions 
stem largely from the fact that the former exercises control over the 
technological relationship with the latter. H. KRONSTEIN, THE LAW OF 
INTERNATIONAL CARTEL (1973) (see, in particular, chapter 3). See also 
Houser & Frahm, Technology, Trade and Law, L. & POL. INT'L BUS., Winter, 
1974, at 85; Hagan & Henry, Is A Compulsory Patent Licensing Statute 
Necessary?, L. & POL. INT'L BUS., Fall, 1975, at 1207. 
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economic aspects of th_ proposals for a NIEO from the politi-
cal ones. Indeed, if one were to take the first, second and 
fourth demands as summarized earlier in this analysis, one 
will find that the first and second involve the removal from 
industrialized states (those Nyerere calls "price-makers") of 
the power to fix prices for commodities sold to them by Third 
World states. Thus, while one may view the proposed change as 
one intended to modify asymmetric commercial relationships in 
which wealth tends to flow in one direction, one must also 
understand that it involves a change in the structure by which 
a few states which had previously enjoyed the power to deter-
mine prices of commodities are no longer able to do so (one 
may but notice the difference in power relationships between 
OPEC and other states when the former gained from the First 
W ld th t d . . )47 f . or e power 0 etermlne prlce . In case 0 pOlnt, 
number four, which calls for shared powers of decision-making, 
were it to be put into operation, the control which a few 
First World states exercise over the IBRD and the IMF -- two 
insti tutions which increasingly have played a preponderant 
role in the regulation of international financial have a 
greater say in these institutions' decision-making process. 
The Legal Thrust 
If law is seen as an instrument of order, and order is 
the result of shared expectations, shared values wi thin a 
community, the law, to the extent it does exist, in municipal 
or international form, must express certain shared expecta-
tions. 48 Third World states feel that many of the rules which 
47. The writer assumes that it is generally known that there has been a 
drastic change in the direction of the flow of wealth. 
48. McDougal, Some Basic Concepts About International Law: A Policy Orient-
ed Framework of Inquiry, 4 J. CONFLICT RESOLUTION 337 (1960). It should 
be observed that reciprocity, as used by some, is sometimes not materially 
different from shared expectations. See,~, Franck & Weisband, The Role 
of Reciprocity and Equivalence in Systemic Superpower Interaction, 3 
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 263 (1970). 
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at a time either when they could be and in fact were disre-
garded bece.use of their weakness or when they had not. ex i. s ted 
as interna·tional legal persons. Thus their expectations were 
not shared by those who created the rules. Phrased somewhat 
differently, the expectations which were shared when the rules 
were created were those of non-TtJird World states. 
st.ates, the international legal system is not one tha l is 
generally expressive of their val ues 'n that e1111lOdj.es tlleir 
expectations. They seek a new order. 
One may, therefore, say that a priJJcipaJ gn c,; of Uw (.i1l1 
for a new international economic onler is a chan'je :Ill the 
norms governing transnational organizations such as the I MF, 
t.he IBRD, and nations like the US, as well uS those flr)rmS 
governing the flow of trade, money, techno logy, and invest-
ment. Underlying this goal respectiD~ international 199al 
norms is the political view that globally applicable norms --
and they are the only ones which can deal with global 
problems -- must. be qlobally ertablisheJ. They should not be 
created by a system in which, in the face of conflicts of 
interests of states (from the time of the Ccncert of Ellrope, 
wi th few exceptions this has been tbe case), the role of the 
major poli t.ical actor·s assume legis] ati ve signi ficance, 
Before one proceeds further, one should perhaps focus on the 
means by which principles of international law come into 
being. Such an approach could help one understand how the 
role of a few states can assume legislative weight. 49 
49. It is not material whether we call them superpowers, major powers, 
great powers or major actors. One may recall how the US, as a young 
Republic, had to struggle with other states with which it collahorated, to 
gain support for freedom of the seas and the rights of neutrals in face of 
resistance by major powers such as Britain and France, See especially the 
problems during the Napoleonic Wars, One may also make note of the League 
of Armed Neutrality of 1780 when Russia, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, the Holy 
Roman Empire, Prussia, Portugal along with belligerents and a few unfriend-
ly states such as the US, France, Spa i nand Ho [land group~d themse 1 ves 
against Britain in order to challenge old norms respecting neutrality --
norms which London sought to preserve, 
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Accordit;g to Article 3fl of the st"tute of the Interna-
ti()nal Court of Justice, the sources of international law are: 
pril1ciples expressly or ot,herwise recognized by parties as 
contained in treaties; custom, as evidence of general practice 
accepted as law; general principles of law recognized by 
civilized nations; and, 
writings of publicists. 
subsidiarily, judicial decisions and 
Because the scope of this paper 
disallows focus on all the sources as they are applicable to 
N1 F:;~'. cllstom vii 11 be the only one used to illustrate the 
aU i tude which chilTacteri zes Tbird Wor Id s tatf:S and the means 
by ",1-·1Ch a LvI sti,tes have historically hild their roles as 
major powers assume legislative signifjcance, 
In cu"'tom. certain principles or rules for which widely 
accepted support is sought (these rules or principles may be 
called norm-candidates,50 are puhlicly articulated by one or 
51 
mor'e states. The reaction of other states to the norm-
candidat.e may be that of rejection, in vrhich case a principle 
of international law by way of custom does not arise. If, 
however, states through their conduct begin to support the 
norm-candidate, overtly or tacitly. a principle of customary 
intenHtional wi 11 have begun its birth. Vlhat is generally 
requi red is that states, as they face international circum-
stances to which the norm-candidate is applicable, demonstrate 
repetitive behavior or patterns of response consistent with 
that sought by the norm-candidate. 
The major European powers have for centuries been norm-
creating states. The role or position they assumed would by 
and of itself create a norm'"candidate. The very articulation 
50. A. D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 74-85 (1971). 
One may wish to note that pronouncements made by a state and relied on by 
other states as evidence of the former's behavior can become binding on 
the prtrty making the statement, See Franck, Word Made Law: The Deci-
si~~~_!c~elCJ ~1~~e~_udt,'~~~y;t __ ~se_1!' 69 AM. J. INT'L 1. 612 (1975). 
51. The forum may vary, It may be wherever recognized representatives of 
strttes happen tu be, providing there is no coercion. 
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through their enacted behavior was enough, since, by virtue of 
their position and power, other members of the international 
communi ty would not or rarely challenge them. The latter 
would usually be followed, that is, other states would acqui-
esce in a course of conduct initiated by the major actors. 
Such is what is meant when one speaks of the role of major 
powers assuming legislative significance. 
The Third World, in its proposals for a New International 
Economic Order, has in fact articulated norm-candidates for 
international relations. And the reaction of the international 
community will determine whether those norm-candidates become 
principles of international law. If one looks at the posture 
of Third World states, one will find that the norm-candidates 
are intended to have far-ranging effects,52 from those of the 
functions of the united Nations and its specialized agencies 
to the sources of international law and the flow of trade, 
money, finance et cetera. The UN will be used as an example. 
If one looks at the Programme of Action, 53 one finds not 
only the requirement that international financial institutions 
be involved in the development process by increasing their 
resources and concern for the least-developed states, without 
considerations of the latter's political and economic system, 
but also that Third World states be significantly involved in 
the activities of these financial institutions by "restruc-
turing the voting arrangements" to limit influence based on 
money. The same article also calls for increasing the role of 
the United Nations system in the industrialization process of 
less-developed states in a number of specific areas. 
The preamble to the united Nations Charter obligates the 
peoples of the United Nations "to employ international machin-
ery for the promotion of the economic and social advancement 
52. This paper cannot focus on the reaction of industrial states to the 
norm-candidates presented by Third World states. Such could be the subject 
of an enlightening paper. " 
53. See note 36, supra. 
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of all peoples ll • 54 Article 55 obligates all members to act in 
the interest of: 
creating conditions of stability and well-being 
which are necessary for peaceful and friendly rela-
tions among nations based on respect for equal 
rights and self-determination of peoples; speci-
fically to promote: 
a. Higher standards of living, full employment, 
and conditions of economic and social progress 
and development. 
b. Solutions of international economic, social, 
health, and related problems. 
However, the behavior of the UN and its members had suggested 
that economic and social advancement for all and economic 
development would come as a result of cooperation among UN 
members. In fact, the title given to Chapter IX of the 
Charter, which begins its major focus on economic and social 
issues, is that of II International Economic and Social Co-
operation." And from a reading of the other pertinent 
articles, 55 including that creating the Economic and Social 
Council, one could reasonably conclude that those who founded 
the UN did not envision it as assuming a fundamental role in 
assuring economic development of its members. The Economic 
and Social Council has been seen as but a co-ordinating organ 
for international economic acti vi ties. Third World states, 
however, have said that the values of co-operation and self-
determination cannot be protected within existing socio-
economic structures, and they now seek to have the UN, as part 
of its function, assume major responsibilities for matters of 
economic development throughout the world. 56 In fact, in a 
more explicit manner, in the UN Committee involved with issues 
of United Nations Charter review, it was suggested that some 
54. Emphasis that of the writer. See also, Article 11, Charter of 
Economic Rights and Duties of States, supra note 36. 
55. See articles 61-72. 
56. For a study of the United Nations and NIEO, see B. MENON, GLOBAL 
DIALOGUE: THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER (1977). 
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of the principles of the Economic Rights and Duties of States 
57 be made part of the UN Charter. 
There is another area on which one should focus in order 
to·re-inforce the point with regard to norm-candidates. It is 
that of the General Assembly as a law-making body. As is 
known, the pronouncements -- be they declarations or resolu-
tions -- by organs of intergovernmental organization are not 
generally assigned legislative authority; and there has been 
significant disagreement as regards the legal weight of actions 
by the General Assembly.58 One thing is sure: it is that the 
latter organ can serve as a forum wi thin which states may 
manifest, by their votes, certain shared expectations which, 
if later embodied in consistent behavior of states, can become 
international law. 
Of the three documents which together contain the propo-
sals for a NIEO, the one on the Charter of Economic Rights and 
Duties of states was adopted by a unanimous vote (131-0-0); 
the other two, the Programme of Action and the Declaration, 
were approved by consensus. 59 The norms offered by the Third 
World states in their proposals for a NIEO, were they to be 
accepted as a standard for future world order, would help to 
re-inforce the view that the General Assembly should be the 
forum within which norm-candidates are pronounced, and perhaps 
57. See Re£ort of the Special Committee of the Charter of the United 
Nations an~ on the Strengthening of the Role of the Organization, 32nd 
Session Supp. No. 33 (A!31!33) (1977) at 202. 
58. D. Y . ASAMOAH, THE LEGAL S I GNIFI CANCE OF THE DECLARATIONS OF THE 
GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS (1966); K. BAILEY, MAKING INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW IN THE UNITED NATIONS PROCEEDINGS 233-239 (1967); J. CASTANEDA, 
LEGAL EFFECTS OF UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS (1970); Falk, On the Quasi-
Legislative Competence of the General Assembly, 60 AM. J. INT'L L. 782 
(1966); R. HIGGINS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH THE 
POLITICAL ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS (1963); Higgins, The United Nations 
and Law-Mak_~~ The Political Organs, 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 37 (1970); G.R. 
LANDE, THE CHANGING EFFECTIVENESS OF ASSEMBLY RESOLUTIONS 162-173 (1964). 
59. There are distinctions between consent and consensus, but there has 
been a discernible movement toward consensus as a basis of legal obli~­
tions. 
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even encourage the development of the General Assembly as the 
place where old norms are challenged, if not where new inter-
national ones are created. 
Conclusion 
The term "Third World ll may be defined as a group of 
states which, because of a condition of structural poverty, 
has tended to reject existing international socio-economic 
structures, and has instead supported the creation of new 
ones. These new structures may be viewed as inaugurating a 
IIthird wayll. 
While it may be well and good to speak of a IIthird way", 
the more important task is to introduce and put into operation 
an alternative conception of community and life-style, and of 
political and social justice. This conception would have the 
following characteristics: first, every state would have a 
right to benefit from the advances and developments in science 
and technology -- not only or primarily those which have 
developed the technology; second, every state would share the 
responsibility for its respective economic relations ln a 
manner which takes into account the interests of other coun-
tries; third, every state would have a duty to contribute to 
the balanced expansion of the world economy, taking into 
account the close inter-relationship between the well-being of 
industrial states and the growth of Third World states, and 
recognizing that the prosperity of the international community 
as a whole depends upon the prosperity of its constituent 
parts; fourth, every state would cooperate in order to streng-
then-and improve the efficiency of international organizations 
so that economic progress for all countries would be assured;60 
finally the IIthird wayll would seek mutual toleration and 
respect for social and cultural diversity. 
When the "third wayll is described as has been done above 
60. See, among others, Articles 11,13,24, and 31 of the Charter of 
Economic Rights and Duties of States, supra note 36. 
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it is not difficult for one to regard it as an excessively 
idealistic vision of the world. Nevertheless, for Third World 
states, if it is an ideal, it is a necessary one, one that 
will serve as a guide to the realization of a new interna-
tional economic and social order. The al ternati ves to this 
ideal can only result in increased tensions 1n international 
relations. 
A future scenario is not difficult to imagine. The 
socio-economic conditions of the Third World give birth to 
fierce and violent conflicts between and among social classes, 
nations, and regions. The industrial states, dependent upon 
the Third World for minerals and other primary commodities,61 
and forced to countenance 
other primary commodities, 
increased unemployment, and 
the loss of needed minerals and 
will experience more inflation, 
concommi tant rises in conflicts 
among 
strata. 
the social classes and among other less privileged 
As the struggle and conflicts assume wider dimen-
sions, the less privileged in the industrial states and the 
people of the Third World will find themselves in a common 
cause. The result? Violence and chaotic destruction of the 
old order. While the above scenario constitutes only a pos-
sible world reality, it suffices to suggest that all states 
share a vital interest in the creation of a "third way", This 
common interest should be manifest in the form of a mutual 
desire to preserve the international community from the vio-
lence and chaos which will accompany the failure to acknow-
ledge and to act upon the need for a new international 
economic order. 
If the goals of the New International Economic Order, if 
the "third way" as envisioned by many Third World states, is 
to be realized, those states, as previously remarked, for 
psychological, moral, and legal reasons, must, in however 
modest form, begin among themselves to introduce and put into 
operation those new values which they are seeking to share 
with the world community. 
61. See supra note 45. 
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